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Abstract: Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut 
Rowe-style inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism 
accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But 
Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to 
“sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but 
counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here 
defend CORNEA against McBrayer's chief counterexample. We first clarify 
CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle that we dub 
‘CORE.’ We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how on 
this construal, the counterexample fails.  
 
The new “inductive atheism” argues that certain empirical features of evil are strong inductive 
(or “probabilistic”) evidence against theism. A feature stressed by William Rowe, for example, is 
the “noseeum” character of much suffering. We can, try as we may, see no God-justifying
1
 (good 
served by much suffering. And our seeing no God-justifying good served by an instance of 
suffering is, it is argued, strong evidence for there being no God-justifying good served by it—
and hence also, by a further short step, for there being no God. Against this reasoning, so-called 
“skeptical theists” press this question:  
Granted, atheism makes the feature you cite—here, the noseem feature—entirely 
expectable. But isn’t this feature also pretty expectable if it were the case that God 
exists? If God were to exist, shouldn’t we expect—God being God and us being 
us—to often not see the goods He purposes for many evils? And if that’s so, how 
can this feature be regarded as strong evidence that God doesn’t exist?  
The skeptical theist here employs a “neutralizing tactic”—a tactic for defusing alleged strong 
evidence—that we can find used in many contexts.
2
 While this neutralizing strategy is intuitively 
appealing, it is not easy to adequately formulate the implicit principle on which it rests. One 
formulation has been Wykstra’s CORNEA—the Condition of ReasoNable Epistemic Access.
3
 
                                                     
 
1
 By a “God-justifying good” served by for an evil, we mean a good that would suffice to justify an all-powerful, all-
knowing, and entirely good Creator in allowing that evil. The question of whether we see any such good in a given 
case is independent of whether God exists and of whether that good is the actual reason justifying God in allowing 
the evil. 
2
 The New Testament scholar F.F. Bruce thus opens Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New Testament (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) by citing a correspondent vexed by whether, in contemporary documents outside the 
New Testament, one finds any “collateral proof of the historical fact of the life of Jesus Christ.” Bruce counters by 
asking (17): in “which contemporary writers during the first fifty years after the death of Christ, would you expect 
to find the collateral evidence you are looking for?” Bruce then argues that we should not, in the nature of the case, 
expect to find the sort of collateral evidence the correspondent finds lacking. 
3
 For earlier discussions of CORNEA, see Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from 
Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 16 




Although CORNEA has morphed through many versions, all versions offer an acid test for 
whether one can reasonably regard some piece of evidence E as being strong
4
 evidence for some 
hypothesis H. The test is this: ask whether, if H were false, E would likely be different. If the 
reasonable answer—what one is warranted in asserting—is “No,” then one isn’t entitled to 
regard E as strong evidence for H.
5
 
Some critics, including Rowe himself, have tended to accept the CORNEA test, arguing only 
that the favored evidential feature passes the test. But others have called the test itself into 
question, including most recently Justin McBrayer.
6
 McBrayer notes that CORNEA resembles 
“truth-tracking” or “sensitivity” theories of knowledge like that of Robert Nozick. Such theories 
place “sensitivity” requirements on knowledge—requirements usually stated using subjunctive 
conditionals. To say that my belief that the chimes on my patio are now ringing is “sensitive” 
means that if they weren’t now ringing, I would not now be forming the belief that they are. 
Nozick’s idea that a belief that p is knowledge only if it is sensitive to p is attractive, but it is 
now widely seen as falling to counterexamples—counterexamples arising, especially, for 
inductive knowledge.
7
 And CORNEA, McBrayer thinks, falls to similar counterexamples. It is, 
he writes, “a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is often insensitive.”
8
 
McBrayer’s counterexamples provide a challenging occasion to probe the foundations of 
skeptical theism. We here focus on two foundational aspects that, in light of McBrayer’s 
treatment, need illumination.  First, McBrayer—appropriating a recent suggestion of Wykstra—
directs his critique against a reformulation of CORNEA  that changes CORNEA into a criterion 
of when something “counts as [strong] evidence.” To develop Wykstra’s suggestion more 
faithfully, we distinguish two principles—the strongly internalist CORNEA, and a strongly 
externalist principle behind CORNEA that we call CORE: 
(CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evidence for 
hypothesis H only if it is true that if H were false, E would likely be different.
 
 
CORNEA expresses an internalist constraint on when one is entitled to regard E as strong 
evidence for H, whereas CORE expresses an externalist constraint on when E actually is strong 
evidence for H. Still, CORE and CORNEA share a common interest, for on each, the crux of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Howard-Snyder, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press, 1996), 126-150; and “CORNEA, Carnap, and 
Current Closure Befuddlement,” Faith and Philosophy, 24.1 (January 2007), 87-98. 
4
 Below, we follow Wykstra in defining “strong evidence” more precisely as “levering evidence.” 
5
 CORNEA offers only a necessary condition for being entitled to regard E as strong evidence for H. If the reasonable 
answer is “Yes,” then one may or may not be entitled to regard E as strong evidence for H. 
6
 Justin McBrayer, “CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,” Faith and Philosophy 26:1 (January 2009), 77-83. All 
McBrayer citations refer to this paper. 
7
  The most well-known sensitivity theory of knowledge is that developed by Robert Nozick in Philosophical 
Explanations (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1981), 167ff.The kinship between CORNEA and Nozickean sensitivity is 
presupposed by Richard Swinburne’s critique in “Does Theism Need a Theodicy?” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 18.2 (June 1988), rebutted by Wykstra’s 2004 APA paper “Skeptical Gambits and the Two Roads to 
Atheism: Swinburne vs. CORNEA.” As Chad McIntosh has called to our attention, CORNEA also has close kin in 
a criterion (for “taking”) given by Roderick Chisholm in his “‘Appear,’ ‘Take,’ and ‘Evident’”, reprinted in 
Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing,  ed. Robert J. Schwarz (U. Cal. Press, 1965), p. 484. For an account of why 
inductive knowledge poses problems for Nozick’s account, see Jonathan Vogel’s “Tracking, Closure, and 
Inductive Knowledge,” in The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics, ed. Steven Luper-Foy (Totowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1989), esp. pp. 204-13. For signs of an opposing groundswell, see Keith 
DeRose, “Insensitivity is Back, Baby!” Philosophical Perspectives, 24, Epistemology, 2010, 161-187. 
8




matter, so to speak, concerns the truth or warranted assertibility (respectively) of a crucial 
conditional that we dub “crux”:  
(crux) if H were false, E would likely be different. 
The second foundational aspect we aim to illuminate is how best to construe crux. Now crux is a 
conditional “were-would” sentence—what we call a grammatical subjunctive. Perhaps due to 
this grammatical feature, McBrayer sees it as a logical subjunctive or counterfactual, and so 
treats it using standard “closest possible worlds” semantics.
9
 We propose taking it as a “non-
counterfactual subjunctive”
10
 best treated as a conditional probability, for which the tool of 
choice is the probability calculus.
11
 This probabilistic treatment enables both CORE and 
CORNEA to handle McBrayer’s chief counterexample; it also, we hope, improves the 
foundations skeptical theism, bringing it into relation with issues of broader epistemological 
interest. 
1.    THE CORE BEHIND CORNEA 
To develop the suggestion that behind the internalist CORNEA is a deeper externalist CORE,  
we do four things here. First, we locate two versions of CORNEA within the dialectic of Rowe’s 
own development of his argument. Second, we explain the type of strong evidence—namely, 
“levering evidence”—that CORNEA is a constraint on. Third, we distinguish CORNEA from 
CORE, contrasting our version of CORE with a flawed version—which we dub 
“McCORNEA”—offered by McBrayer. And fourth, we introduce the probabilistic approach to 
crux, the crucial conditional in both CORE and CORNEA. 
1.1.  ROWE’S APPEARS-IDIOM AND TWO VERSIONS OF CORNEA 
CORNEA proposes a necessary condition on the type of confirming evidence that Rowe-style 
arguments purport to offer. Rowe’s earliest arguments couch this evidence using the appears-
idiom.
12
 A central strand of his argument can be represented as follows. Consider a case of a 
fawn horribly burned in a distant forest fire, lying in suffering for days before dying. Our 
cognitive situation is that: 
(Rowe-1) We can, try as we may, see no God-justifying good served by the fawn’s 
suffering.  
This feature of our cognitive situation, Rowe thinks, entitles us to claim: 
(Rowe-2) It appears that there is no such God-justifying good served by the fawn’s 
suffering. 
                                                     
 
9
 On such a standard semantics, a broadly counterfactual conditional is true just in case the consequent is true in the 
closest antecedent world(s)—the closest world(s) where the antecedent is true. See Lewis, Counterfactuals, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), and Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” in Conditionals, eds. Frank Jackson, 
(Oxford: Oxford, 1991), 28-45. The differences between Lewis and Stalnaker will not affect our treatment here. 
10
 Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” in Jackson, Conditionals, 136-54, especially 146. See also Alan Ross 
Anderson, “A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals,” Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec., 1951), 35-8. 
11
 Cf. Wykstra’s “CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement,” 89, fn. 12: “…I originally meant the 
subjunctive formulation [in CORNEA] to express probabilistic implications of theories with Bayes’ theorem in 
mind; the appropriateness of Lewis-Stalnaker semantics here needs scrutiny.” 
12
 William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 
(1979), 335-41. Our representation here is meant to bring out the salient features relevant to a CORNEA defense, 




 And this appears-claim, he thinks, warrants the conclusion that:  
(Rowe-3) Probably, there is no God-justifying good served by this suffering.
13
  
We construe Rowe-2 as claiming that the noseeum feature of suffering is prima facie 
evidence against theism. And the step from Rowe-2 to Rowe-3 is best construed as drawing upon 
the norms governing how things epistemically “appear” to one.
14
 It is licensed by an epistemic 
principle of justification that Swinburne calls the principle of credulity: when something 
epistemically appears to be a certain way, then it reasonable for one—barring defeaters—to 
believe that it is that way. Thus, if one lacks any defeaters, the noseeum feature of suffering can, 
by itself, be sufficient to reasonably warrant a shift from agnosticism to atheism. 
The nerve of Wykstra’s critique was to argue that Rowe’s argument fails in its very first 
step—in the move from Rowe-1 to Rowe-2. While the move from “we see no such-and-such” to 
“it appears that there is no such-and-such” may seem innocuous, it is legitimate in some cases 
but illegitimate in others. For example, suppose your doctor drops a hypodermic needle on the 
floor, picks it up, looks at it carefully, and proceeds to try to use it on your arm. When you 
protest that it may be contaminated, he reasons as follows: 
(Needle-1) We can, try as we may, see no viruses on the needle. 
(Needle-2) Hence, it appears that there are no viruses on the needle. 
(Needle-3) So probably (barring defeaters), there are no viruses on the needle. 
You will certainly think your doctor has gone wrong in getting to Needle-3. But should you think 
that he has, in this situation, gone wrong in the very move from Needle-1 to Needle-2? Friends 
of CORNEA think you should.
15
 For if there were viruses on the needle, then given the nature of 
viruses and of human vision, failing to see them is precisely and obviously what you (and the 
doctor) should expect. For this reason, not seeing such viruses in no way entitles the doctor to 
claim that there appear to be no viruses on the needle. CORNEA simply generalizes this 
intuitive constraint:  
(CORNEA-1) On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “it 
appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her 
cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s 
would likely be different than it is in some way discernible to her.
16
 
To apply CORNEA to Rowe’s argument, we must ask whether there are, on balance, good 
reasons to think that if God were to exist, then God-justifying goods connected to observed cases 
of suffering would, by virtue of God’s nature and our human limitations, often not be evident to 
us. If there are such reasons, and Rowe is made cognizant of them, then it is not (or cannot 
                                                     
 
13
 In “Problem of Evil” Rowe, instead of using the term “probably,” tends to put this as ‘it appears reasonable to 
believe that...” As explained in the next section, we take Rowe-3 to be leaving open the possibility that other parts 
of one’s total evidence might defeat the strong prima facie evidence provided by the facts of evil. Rowe-3 thus has 
an implicit “barring defeaters” clause making it still a claim about the prima facie or in-itself weight of the 
adduced data. 
14 
Cf. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” 85ff. 
15 
McBrayer links his reformulation of CORNEA (discussed below) to the contention that one should meet evidential 
arguments in the appears-idiom by resisting the move from the second claim (e.g., Rowe-2) to the third claim (e.g., 
Rowe-3), while not resisting the move from first claim (e.g. Rowe-1) to the second (Rowe-2). But this implies that 
in the needle case, one will not resist the doctor’s claim that there appear to be no viruses on the needle. We take 
this as a reductio ad absurdum of McBrayer’s contention. 
16




remain) reasonable for him to believe crux. And if this is so, then, by CORNEA, Rowe is not 
entitled to his claim that there appears to be no God-justifying good served by the observed cases 
of suffering. Such a claim is as ill-founded as our doctor’s claim that there appear to be no 
viruses on the needle. 
CORNEA was initially formulated using the “appears” idiom because this was prominent in 
Rowe’s own formulation of his argument. But Rowe later reformulates his argument without 
using the appears-idiom. CORNEA is easily reformulated to follow suit, and thereby assumes a 
more general and powerful form.
17
 It can thus be reformulated as:  
(CORNEA-2) For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, P is entitled to claim that 
new evidence E is levering evidence for H only if it is reasonable for P to 
believe that (crux) if H were false, E would, in the situation S, likely be 
different. 
CORNEA-2 places the same condition on claims regarding levering evidence as CORNEA-1 
places on epistemic appears-claims. While the two sorts of claims have identical import, it is 
preferable to work with this more general levering-evidence version of CORNEA. In what 
follows, the term CORNEA shall thus refer to CORNEA-2. 
1.2.  WHAT CORNEA CONSTRAINS: LEVERING EVIDENCE AND THE BY/ON DISTINCTION 
CORNEA proposes a constraint on “Rowean” evidence—the type of confirming evidence that 
Rowe-style arguments purport to provide against theism. We call such evidence “levering 
evidence.” As we use this term, evidence E qualifies as levering evidence for a hypothesis H 
only if E has the following three features. 
First, to be levering evidence, E must consist of some alleged fact(s) or input such that 
acquiring or getting this input properly changes
18
 the probability or credibility of hypothesis H 
from what it was prior to, or apart from, getting E.
19
 Levering evidence is thus—to adopt the 
terminology of an earlier paper
20
—“dynamic.” That is, it is by the addition of evidence, that the 
probability of a hypothesis is levered, or shifted, to a new value. Levering evidence, and dynamic 
evidence more generally, must be carefully distinguished from “static” evidence. E is static 
confirming evidence for H only if the probability of H, on E, is above some relevant threshold 
(e.g. .5). A hypothesis may be made more probable by some fact, even if the hypothesis has 
(statically) a low probability on that fact.
21
  
                                                     
 
17
 For a review of the dialectic, see Rowe “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, (2006) 59: 79-92; Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from 
Evil.” Wykstra discusses the special and general formulations in Wykstra “Suffering, Evidence, and Analogy: 
Noseeum Arguments Versus Skeptical Gambits,” in Philosophy through Science Fiction, eds. Ryan Nicholas, et. 
al, (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
18
 Here the normative “proper” carries the idea that although E may not actually change the person’s belief regarding 
H (due to some cognitive defect, say), E is (epistemically) able to do so: it has what it takes to do so. 
19
 Here the “prior to or apart from” allows that the “new” alleged facts may be either newly acquired facts or more 
familiar facts whose relation to the hypothesis is being newly considered or re-considered. (Here and elsewhere 
comments by Paul Draper were helpful.) 
20 
“CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement,” 91. 
21
 On the By/On distinction see Wykstra “CORNEA, Carnap,” 91. There is a further distinction to be made here 
between the “isolated” static probability of H on E alone, and its “holistic” static probability on E plus one’s other 




For example—to adapt an example from Elliott Sober
22
—suppose that I am playing poker and 
want to know if the card I am about to be dealt will be the Jack of Hearts. The dealer is careless, 
and I see that the next card is red. The fact that the card is red “confirms” in a dynamic sense that 
the card is the Jack of Hearts, potentially doubling its probability—from 1 in 52 (about .02) to 1 
in 26 (about .04). Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the next card is the Jack of Hearts is still very 
improbable on the fact that the next card is red. So in a static sense, the fact that the card is red 
does not “confirm” the hypothesis that the next card is the Jack of Hearts, since the probability is 
below the relevant threshold of (say) .5. 
The second feature of levering evidence E is that E must properly change the probability or 
credibility of the hypothesis sharply. To give this content, we follow Wykstra’s earlier article
23
 
in distinguishing between three “square” doxastic states—namely, square belief, square disbelief, 
and square non-belief (that is, squarely suspended or withheld belief). We also adopt his 
simplifying assumption
24
 that “square belief” can be associated with giving a proposition a 
probability (or degree of credibility) fairly close to 1 (say, .99 or higher), “square disbelief” with 
giving the proposition a probability close to 0 (say, .01 or below), and “square non- belief” with 
giving the proposition a probability of around .5.
25
 We then call a doxastic change a “sharp” 
change if it is from one square doxastic state to another—in particular, from square non-belief to 
square belief.
26
 By “levering evidence” we thus mean evidence for or against a hypothesis that is 
of sufficient strength to shift the rational credibility of a hypothesis from one square state to 
another. We formulate crux as a condition on levering evidence for a hypothesis. It is also a 
condition on levering evidence against a hypothesis, since to claim E is levering evidence 
against a hypothesis is to claim that E is levering evidence for the denial of that hypothesis.
27
 
Third, we intend this notion of levering evidence—in keeping with Rowe-style arguments—to 
capture what might be called the prima facie (rather than ‘ultima facie’) bearing of E on H.
28
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 Sober gives a similar example in Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards: Philosophical Essays on Darwin’s 
Theory (New York: Prometheus Books, 2011), 145-6. Sober uses his example to target “the special consequence 
condition of confirmation” as formulated by Hempel in his classic 1945 paper “Studies in the Logic of 
Confirmation” Mind, 54. 1-26 and 97-121. It should be noted, however, that under Carnap’s tutoring, Hempel 
revised his early ambiguous formulation, and that the improved principle—now restricted to static confirmation—
is correct. See Hempel’s Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: MacMillan, 1965), especially “Studies in 
the Logic of Confirmation,” fn. 40 and “Postscript (1964) On Confirmation,” 49-50. 
23
 Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” 130-2. 
24 
This is, we stress, a simplifying assumption in which the vague term “associate” is used advisedly. Given the 
vagaries of the concept of belief, it may be preferable to speak of squarely “accepting” a proposition, for  
identifying belief with being above any probabilistic threshold leads quickly into familiar lottery paradoxes. We 
think our results will be sustainable however these tricky issues are eventually negotiated. (Comments by Glenn 
Ross were helpful to us here.) 
25 
We emphasize here that the values we are assigning are elucidatory; that square beliefs, along with square non-
belief, represent more of a range of values. 
26
 Levering in this way is by no means an unrealistically high bar for evidence to meet. The simplest testimonial 
evidence is, for example, able to exceed this bar without difficulty. A colleague informing me that he has three 
children properly levers me to believing that he has three children, even though I was in a state of square 
agnosticism prior to that. 
27
 We thank an anonymous referee for urging more clarity on this point. 
28
 Thus Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,”: “[Rowe’s] overall claim… is that the evidence of suffering supports 
atheism in what we might call a “qualifiedly strong” sense, viz., it strongly supports atheism provided that 
independent assessments of theistic arguments show these to be as weak as Rowe, based on his independent study 




Here we may think of ourselves as like Blind Lady Justice. Eventually, she wants to be in a 
position to weigh all the evidence for and against a particular hypothesis in the two pans of her 
scales. But initially, she wants to determine how weighty some individual pieces of evidence are. 
She thus starts from some squarely neutral or “even” position, and asks how much some item of 
interest can tilt her balance from that even position. An answer to this question—the one, we 
think, Rowe means to be addressing—leaves open the further question of how the scales will tilt 
when any opposing evidence is placed on the other pan. 
1.3.  THE REAL CORE OF CORNEA: CORE VS. MCCORNEA 
CORNEA posits a constraint on when someone is entitled to claim, in some cognized situation, 
that certain data or input is levering evidence for some hypothesis.
29
 This constraint is 
‘internalist,’ for it requires that it be, for this person, reasonable to believe that the following test 
condition is satisfied: if H were false, then E would likely be different. CORNEA’s constraint is 
thus doubly internalist: it is a constraint on when a person is entitled to make a levering-evidence 
claim, and the constraint itself is that it be reasonable for that person to believe
30
 a particular 
conditional claim (namely, crux).  
As McBrayer notes, Wykstra has recently suggested that “behind CORNEA” is a deeper idea:  
the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether some alleged 
evidence seriously ‘supports’ —in a sense to be clarified presently— some 
hypothesis H. [The test is this: ask whether, if H were false, E would likely be 
different. If the answer is “No,” then E can’t seriously support H.]
31
 
McBrayer, picking up on this suggestion, urges that CORNEA should itself be seen as “a 
restriction on when any ‘cognized situation’ counts as evidence” for a hypothesis. He offers his 
own rendition of CORNEA, which we will call McCORNEA:  
McCORNEA: A subject S’s cognitive situation C is evidence for P only if it is 




And he supports this rendering of CORNEA by selectively quoting Wykstra: “Wykstra concedes 
as much: “the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether some alleged evidence 
seriously ‘supports’ . . . some hypothesis H.”
33
 
But McCORNEA has three problems. First, whereas Wykstra’s “key idea” refers to a 
constraint on evidence that seriously supports a hypothesis, McCORNEA makes this a constraint 
on evidence simpliciter.
34
 Second, whereas McBrayer intends to be offering a formulation of 
CORNEA, Wykstra is not. He is attempting to articulate the “key idea behind CORNEA.” And 
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 Or “entitled to regard” it as levering evidence. 
30
 In the sense used here, it can be reasonable for a person to believe a proposition even if he or she does not believe 
this in any conscious way; see Wykstra’s dispositional explication in “Humean Obstacle,” 87. 
31
 Wykstra, “CORNEA, Carnap,” p. 88. McBrayer’s quotation omits the parts we have here put in brackets, which 
will become important below. 
32
 McBrayer, 81 (italics ours). McBrayer renders what follows “…reasonable to believe” as a counterfactual in David 
Lewis’ notation. We have restored it to a grammatical subjunctive. McBrayer also omits the crucial “likely” that 
we have here put in brackets. 
33
 McBrayer, 81, citing Wykstra’s “CORNEA, Carnap,” 88. 
34
 Here by his ellipses, McBrayer is omitting Wykstra’s “—in a sense to be clarified presently—”. By this phrase 





this key idea concerns a constraint on when some datum is levering evidence—to be 
distinguished from CORNEA’s constraint on when the datum can be reasonably regarded as 
levering evidence. Third, whereas on McCORNEA, the constraint itself is internalist (that it be 
reasonable for a person to believe the crux subjunctive), on Wykstra’s suggestion, the constraint 
is an externalist one (that crux be true). 
The key idea that McBrayer imperfectly appropriates, then, is this: that “behind” the 
internalist CORNEA is a deeper externalist principle, one that lends plausibility and support to 
CORNEA. And just as CORNEA is doubly internalist, so this deeper principle is doubly 
externalist. It is externalist, first, in what it is a constraint on—namely, on when something is 
evidence of the “seriously supporting” (i.e., levering) type. It is externalist, second, in what the 
constraint is—namely, that it be true that, if H were false, then E would likely be different.
35
 The 
deeper CORE principle, put side by side with CORNEA, is then as follows:  
CORNEA CORE 
For person P in cognitive situation S, P is 
entitled to claim that new evidence E is 
levering evidence for H only if it is reasonable 
for P to believe that (crux) if H were false, E 
would, in the situation, likely be different. 
In cognitive situation S giving person P new 
input E, E is levering evidence for 
hypothesis H only if it is true that (crux) if 
H were false, E would likely be different.
36
 
1.4. UNDERSTANDING CORNEA’S CONDITIONAL  
We’ve seen that both CORE and CORNEA have, at their heart, the conditional proposition 
we’ve dubbed crux:  
crux: if H were false, E would likely be different. 
The crux proposition is a grammatical subjunctive, a conditional in the subjunctive mood. 
Due to this grammatical feature, McBrayer takes it as expressing a logical subjunctive, or 
“counterfactual conditional.” Consequently he evaluates it using the possible-world semantics 
pioneered by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. But here caution is in order. As Stalnaker 
himself notes, grammatical subjunctives sometimes express, not logical subjunctives, but instead 
“non-counterfactual subjunctives.” His example of a non-counterfactual subjunctive is:  




Stalnaker envisions this sentence as uttered in a context where the speaker—perhaps a 
detective—is arguing that the evidence confirms that the butler did do it. In calling this 
subjunctive “non-counterfactual,” Stalnaker does not simply mean that its antecedent is not 
                                                     
 
35
 In addition to the well-known constraint on knowledge found in Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (172ff.), there 
is also a little-discussed section (248ff.) in which Nozick also defends a sensitivity constraint on evidence. He 
proposes that in order for E to be evidence for a hypothesis H, it must be true that “if H weren’t true, then E 
wouldn’t hold.” Nozick’s constraint is distinct from CORE in at least the following way: it has a wider domain—
over any evidence—whereas CORE is a constraint only on levering evidence. 
36 
A slightly different—but not equivalent—formulation is “In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering 
evidence against hypothesis H only if, were H true, E would not likely be the same.” 
37
 Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” 146. The striking affinity of CORNEA with Stalnaker’s example needs no 
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would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.” See Anderson’s “A Note on 




contrary-to-fact. He means more deeply that such grammatical subjunctives should not be 
evaluated using a Lewis-Stalnaker closest-possible-worlds semantic.
38
  
We agree with Stalnaker that some grammatical subjunctives are not best understood as 
logical subjunctives. Further, his example strikingly illustrates the natural use of grammatical 
subjunctives to express the evidential implications so vital to hypothesis testing. It is natural to 
say, for example: “If Huygen’s vortex theory of gravity were true, it is entirely expectable that 
the planets would revolve around the sun in the same direction; whereas if Newton’s theory were 
true, this phenomenon would be rather improbable.” 
As we see it, the most promising way to think about these evidential implications is as 
conditional probabilities. The examples are then saying that the probability of finding just the 
evidence that was found, conditional on the hypothesis that the butler did do it (and our other 
background information), is high, and that the conditional probability of the planets revolving 
around the sun in the same direction is high on Huygens’s theory, but not on Newton’s theory. 
We thus suggest that, in the hypothesis-testing context, grammatical subjunctives are often best 
understood as expressing evidential implications of hypotheses, and that such implications are 
best understood as conditional probabilities.  
To be sure, understanding grammatical subjunctives in this way also raises some vexing 
issues about whether the formalism of the probability calculus—and the formal notion of 
conditional probability that is defined within it—has any meaningful general application to the 
arena of hypothesis testing. Some thinkers—Richard Von Mises, for example—argue that it is 
wrong-headed to think that the probability calculus has any relevance to evaluating historical 
evidence for hypotheses about unique events or processes (say, the hypothesis that Kennedy was 
killed by Lee Harvey Oswald, or that Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead). The probability 
calculus and formal notion of conditional probability, as von Mises sees it, has relatively narrow 
application—it applies only, he thinks, to “mass phenomena” involving events of an indefinitely 
repeatable type, allowing us to assign long-term ratios of favorable outcomes within an 
indefinitely large class.  
Others, like Rudolf Carnap, think that the probability calculus and notion of conditional 
probability has broader application. On Carnap’s view, for example, the probability relation can 
be modeled by logical relations of “partial entailment” between propositions, even where these 
involve no mass phenomena or discrete repeatable events to which frequency-ratios can be 
assigned. Such partial-entailment relations, Carnap thinks, bear intimately on the rational 
credibility of hypotheses. Working within this Carnapian tradition, Richard Swinburne thinks 
that even if there is only one unique universe, we can meaningful speak of the conditional 
probability of (say) the phenomenon of beauty on the hypothesis that God created that universe, 
and compare this with conditional probability of beauty on a naturalistic hypothesis. And even if 
we can only attach comparative estimates to these conditional probabilities, Swinburne thinks we 
can properly and usefully employ the probability calculus to help us discern, in a comparative 
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though admittedly non-quantitative way, how the probability—interpreted as “rational 
credibility”—of each hypothesis changes as a widening range of evidence is taken into account.
39
  
While our sympathies lie with these broader applications, we concede to von Mises that in 
these broader applications, it is often not easy to say what relationship between propositions is 
being mapped onto the conditional probability relation. Happily, however, McBrayer’s chief 
counterexample to CORNEA involves a lottery scenario—just the sort of case involving those 
limit frequencies that, as von Mises helps us see, affords the best traction for the conditional 
probability relation within the probability calculus. 
Taking crux in this way, we’ll understand “If H were false, E would likely be different” as 
saying that the conditional probability of E, given the falsity of H, is low—at least below .5. Put 
in standard notation, this says that P(E|~H) < .5.  So instead of approaching crux by using a 
possible world semantics, we use the probability calculus as our tool of choice, making use of 
Bayes’ theorem and weighted averages. Taken simply as a theorem in the probability calculus, 
Bayes’ theorem is usually put as: 
                  (      )           ( )                   [
  (     )
  ( )
 ]  
But as Swinburne and Wesley Salmon have taught us,
40
 this formula can be applied to the 
relationship between a hypothesis H and alleged confirming evidence E. On this application, we 
take the “absolute” probabilities P(A) and P(B) as P(H|k) and P(E|k)—that is, as the background 
probabilities of H and E on some relevant background information k. Bayes’ theorem then tells 
us that P(H | E & k)—the new probability of H when E is added to k—is as follows: 
                  (         )           (     )                        [
  (        )
  (E    )
 ]  
As we’ll see, Bayes’ theorem will be a powerful tool for applying CORNEA and CORE to 
McBrayer’s chief counterexample scenario.  
2.   MCBRAYER’S LOTTO ARGUMENT 
Having clarified CORNEA and CORE, we now consider how each principle fares against 
McBrayer’s counterexample. His paper puts the most weight on his first “lottery” 
counterexample, so we shall do so as well. We shall, following McBrayer’s lead, finesse his 
initial scenario so as to make his counterexample applicable to the more mature and sober 
versions of CORNEA (and CORE).  
McBrayer initially formulates his lottery argument as follows: 
Though I hold a ticket, I believe that I will lose the lottery. I have inductive 
evidence for this claim. I know that the odds of winning are one in a million. Is 
my evidence sensitive to the fact that I will lose the lottery? Go to the closest 
world in which I win. I just get lucky and pull the right ticket. Is it reasonable to 
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believe that my cognitive situation in the actual world would be discernibly 
different from my cognitive situation in the possible world in which I win? No—
things would look just the same to me. So, my cognized situation in this case is 
not evidence for the claim that I will lose the lottery.  
Let’s here refer to the ticket-holder as “Holt,” so as to keep his beliefs distinct from McBrayer’s 
claims about him. McBrayer portrays Holt as both knowing that  
(1) The odds of (Holt) winning are one in a million. 
and as taking (1) to be “inductive evidence for”  
(2) Holt will lose the lottery. 
Our intuition, McBrayer thinks, is that in this scenario, (1) is inductive evidence for (2). But is 
CORNEA consistent with this intuition? It is consistent, on McBrayer’s line of thought,
 41
 only if 
it reasonable for Holt to believe the crucial conditional: 




McBrayer thinks that crux is neither true nor reasonable for him [or Holt] to believe. For in the 
closest world where Holt wins the lottery—the world where, by luck, he has simply drawn the 
winning ticket—(1) isn’t any different. Things “would look just the same.” And that things 
would look the same is, McBrayer says, something that “I [and Holt] know full well.” Thus, it is 
not reasonable for him [or Holt] to believe crux. In this way, neither CORNEA nor CORE seems 
consistent with our best epistemic intuitions.  
2.1. FIRST IMPROVEMENTS  
McBrayer, alerted by an anonymous referee, goes on to improve this scenario in several 
important ways. He notes—in accord with our own exegesis above—that in its later and more 
mature formulations, CORNEA is formulated as a constraint not on “evidence simpliciter” but 
on a specific sort of evidence, namely, “dynamic” evidence of “levering” strength.
43
 But in his 
scenario as currently specified, proposition (1) does not clearly function as levering evidence. 
For the scenario does not describe Holt as being in some initial doxastic state, and then shifting 
to some new doxastic state; nor does it describe the shift so as to make clear that it is a proper 
shift from square non-belief to square belief; nor does it specify some specific cognitive input 
that effects this shift. The counterexample thus, he notes, might be dismissed as attacking only a 
straw man.  
But McBrayer argues that his scenario is easily improved so as to make Holt’s evidence a 
clear case of levering evidence—while still clearly failing CORNEA’s test.
 
Here is his finesse of 
the scenario to that end: 
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 McBrayer counterexample, while directed against the misbegotten McCORNEA, can without loss (or gain) be 
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 [Holt] is given a lottery ticket in ignorance of how many tickets are sold. Perhaps 
Holt has the only ticket, or perhaps there are a million tickets. Being rational, Holt 
withholds belief concerning the proposition that he will win the lottery. Later Holt 
learns that the odds of winning are one in a million. Based on this new 
information, Holt disbelieves that he will win the lottery. [Holt’s] cognitive 
situation in this case warrants a revision from non-belief to disbelief. The 
evidence is therefore levering evidence.
44
 
2.2. SECOND IMPROVEMENTS 
The added details in McBrayer’s finesse go some distance toward giving a situation in which 
there is a shift from square non-belief to square belief (or square disbelief),
45
 and thus a case of 
levering evidence. But they do not, we think, give enough detail to specify a specific cognitive 
input that is affecting this shift.
46
 As stated, the scenario still specifies the basis of the shift as 
Holt’s “knowing that” 
(1) The odds of (Holt) winning are one in a million. 
But this is entirely too vague. It gives no concrete depiction of what Holt’s specific new 
“cognitive input situation” is supposed to be.
47
 The belief (or “knowledge”) that (1), after all, 
normally rests on a very complex bramble of considerations put in place over a long period of 
time. One of these is the information Holt has as to the size of the lottery; but in grounding (1), 
this works in tandem with many other considerations that are normally part of one’s background 
beliefs—e.g., that the lottery tickets are distributed by a humanly fair non-rigged process, that no 
angels or other supernatural beings are giving one special dibs on winning lotteries of this sort, 
and so forth. 
We will improve the scenario by specifying that one of these considerations is a new 
cognitive input situation, so that it is intuitively clear that this input will, when added to other 
normal background considerations already in place, significantly raise the probability or degree 
of confidence of (1). The simplest way to do this is to suppose that what Holt receives, as new 
input, is reliable information about the size of the lottery. Our improvements thus extend 
McBrayer’s finesse by adding to the improved scenario that Holt gets specific new input from a 
reliable source that (1’) the lottery is a million ticket lottery, and that prior to learning this, Holt 
has in place other normal background beliefs—of the sort just mentioned—so that this new input 
does greatly increase his degree of confidence in (2).  
2.3.  THIRD IMPROVEMENTS 
Despite the important finesses made so far, the improved LOTTO scenario is still flawed. The 
scenario is meant to be one in which Holt’s cognitive situation clearly effects and warrants a shift 
from square non-belief to square belief. But does such a shift occur in the scenario as described 
so far? Notice, in particular, Holt’s initial doxastic state:  
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[Holt] is given a lottery ticket in ignorance of how many tickets are sold. 
Perhaps Holt has the only ticket, or perhaps there are a million tickets. Being 
rational, Holt withholds [i.e., suspends] belief concerning the proposition that 
he will win the lottery. 
Here we can read the word “perhaps” in two very different ways. On the most natural reading, 
the two possibilities mentioned are illustrative. Holt knows he holds a lottery ticket, but he has 
no idea how large the lottery is: perhaps it is from one-ticket lottery, or perhaps from a two ticket 
lottery, or perhaps a three-ticket one… up to (let’s say) a one-million ticket lottery.
48
 But read in 
this way, the story does not give a scenario in which Holt is in an initial state of square non-
belief, that is, of squarely suspended belief. Such a state is, we saw, a confidence level associated 
with a probability of around .5. But on the present reading, Holt’s situation is tantamount to one 
in which it is equally probable that his ticket is from a one-ticket lottery, or that it is from a two-
ticket lottery, ...up to a million ticket lottery. A little calculation shows that in this situation, the 
probability of holding a winning ticket is nowhere near .5: instead it is something like 1 in 
70,000, making the probability of holding losing ticket something like 69,999 in 70,000, or .999 
986.
49
 Holt’s initial situation thus does not warrant a state of square non-belief at all; what is 
initially warranted is instead a confidence level associated with a .999986 probability. And his 
new evidence, instead of levering him from a doxastic state of around .5 to something well over 
.99, nudges him from a .999986 doxastic “square belief” state to a .999999 doxastic “square 
belief” state. 
To remedy this problem, we shall re-structure the scenario so that Holt’s initial situation is 
one in which the two possibilities mentioned by McBrayer (i.e., “perhaps I have the only ticket, 
or perhaps there are a million others”) are not illustrative, but instead exhaustive. Holt, let us 
suppose, knows that his ticket is from one of two lotteries—either from a million-ticket lottery, 
or from a single ticket lottery. The scenario does now put Holt in an initial state of squarely 
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-
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. The series in brackets, [1/1 +1/2 + 1/3 + 1/10
-6
 ], is equal to about 14.39. The weighted 
summation is thus 14.39 / 10
6
, or roughly 14 in a million, which is roughly 1 in 70,000—pretty long odds. We 
thank Harry Plantinga in Calvin’s Computer Science Department for grinding out the 14.39 using a quickly written 




suspended belief about whether he has a losing or winning ticket. And consequently, his new 
evidence—that his ticket is from a million ticket lottery—does now dynamically shift Holt from 
square non-belief to square belief that the ticket he holds is a losing ticket.
50
 Here, then, is our 
triply-improved version of McBrayer’s LOTTO scenario, with some details added for ease of 
reference:  
Holt has purchased two tickets, one for a one-ticket raffle at a Dutch church 
picnic (with a used Psalter hymnal prize), and the other from a million-ticket 
Catholic raffle. He stores them in his room. He then finds one ticket missing—his 
thieving brother Klep slipped into the room and stole one of them. Holt knows 
this much, but he doesn’t know which ticket Klep stole. In this initial evidential 
situation, the odds that he holds the Dutch ticket are thus 50/50. Holt’s initial state 
is one of squarely suspended-belief about whether he holds the losing (or 
winning) ticket. 
    But Holt now gets new input: Klep, in his usual compulsively honest way, 
breaks down and confesses that the ticket he stole is the Dutch ticket. Getting this 
new information properly levers Holt from square non-belief into square belief 
that the ticket he holds is a losing (because Catholic) ticket. Klep’s testimony thus 
qualifies as levering evidence. 
 We think this triply-improved scenario puts McBrayer’s scenario in its most formidable 
form. Now Holt’s new cognitive input does seem to function as levering evidence: it shifts 
Holt—properly, it seems—from squarely suspended belief to square belief that he holds a losing 
ticket. At the same time, this evidence does not seem to satisfy the constraints that CORNEA and 
CORE—using crux—put on levering evidence. And it does not seem to for the very reasons that 
McBrayer—adopting a counterfactual reading of crux—gives: in the closest possible world 
where Holt—by luck—has a winning ticket, his new inductive evidence (Klep’s testimony to 
stealing the Dutch ticket) is exactly the same. Hence, if Holt were to have the winning ticket, his 
evidence would not be different—instead, it would be the same. So it seems that Holt’s evidence 
fails both the CORNEA and CORE tests.  
With the triply-improved scenario in mind, we thus put McBrayer’s argument as follows:  
(Lotto-1) If CORE [CORNEA] is right, then in the improved lottery scenario, Holt does 
not have [and is not entitled to claim that he has] levering evidence that his 
ticket is a losing ticket.
51
 
(Lotto-2) But in the improved lottery scenario, Holt has [and is entitled to claim he has] 
levering evidence that his ticket is a losing ticking. 
(Lotto-3) So CORE [CORNEA] is false. 
3.  CORE AS CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY: WHAT BAYES’ THEOREM REQUIRES 
According to CORE, E is levering evidence for H only if crux—if H were false, then E would 
likely be different—is true. In his LOTTO counterexample, McBrayer interprets crux as a logical 
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subjunctive, using Lewis-Stalnaker semantics to evaluate it. But as noted above, crux can also be 
interpreted as a conditional probability. Putting these two interpretations
52
 of CORE side by side: 
(CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evidence for H only if it is the 
case that: (crux) If H were false, then E would likely be different. 
(C-CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new 
input E, E is levering evidence for H 
only if it is the case that: (c-crux) in 
the closest possible world(s) in 
which not-H is true, E is [likely] not 
true. 
(P-CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new 
input E, E is levering evidence for H 
only if it is the case that: (p-crux) the 
conditional probability of E on not-
H— viz, P (E | not-H & k)—is below 
.5. 
 
Now McBrayer cases threaten C-CORE (and CORNEA) because in them, E seems to be 
levering evidence even though the c-crux requirement evidently fails to be satisfied. We will 
argue here that interpreting CORE as P-CORE deflects this threat, and puts us in a position to see 
why, in cases like these, counterfactual conditionals behave differently than conditional 
probabilities. In Section 3, we show that Bayes’ theorem itself entails—in perfect accord with P-
CORE—that p-crux must be satisfied if E is to be levering evidence for H. In Section 4, we then 
use an expanded form of Bayes’ theorem to show that—and, more importantly, why—p-crux is 
indeed true in McBrayer’s LOTTO scenario, so that P-CORE is satisfied in this scenario. (We 
also show that on this treatment, p-crux is reasonable to believe in this scenario, so that the 
probabilistic version of CORNEA—P-CORNEA, as it were—is also satisfied.)  
 Since our focus in Sections 3 and 4 will be entirely on the probabilistic versions of CORE, 
and crux, these sections will use the terms “CORNEA” and CORE” and “crux” to refer to their 
probabilistic P-versions.  
3.1.   DICTIONARY OF ABBREVIATIONS   
When we take crux as a conditional probability, CORE says that E is levering evidence for H 
only if, in the situation, we wouldn’t likely get evidence E on not-H—that is, only if it the 
conditional probability of E on not-H is below .5. Here, then, is the probabilistic rendering of 
CORE:  
(P-CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evidence for H 
only if it is the case that: the conditional probability of E on not-H— viz, P (E 
| not-H & k)—is below .5. 
 To see how P-CORE handles McBrayer cases—and begin to see why it works differently 
from C-CORE—we view the question through the lens of a standard application of Bayes’ 
theorem: 
                   (         )           (     )                        [
  (        )
  (E    )
 ]  
 NEW PROB of H  =      OLD PROB OF H     *   “THE QUOTIENT” 
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On this application, Bayes’ theorem tells us that the “new probability” of a hypothesis—
namely, P(H| E & k)—is equal to the “old probability” of H on k alone—namely, P (H | k)—
times a special fraction that John Maynard Keynes called “the relevance quotient,” and that we 
shall just call “The Quotient.” In it, the numerator P(E | H & k) represents how probable, or 
“expectable”, the evidence E is, on the assumption that hypothesis H (together with our 
background information k) is true. The denominator P(E | k) represents how likely the evidence 
E is, merely on the assumption of our background knowledge k by itself. We shall refer to these 
as, respectively, the “hypothetical expectability” of the new evidence E (its likelihood assuming 
the hypothesis is true) and the “background expectability” of E (its likelihood on the mere 
assumption of the background information alone). 
In applying Bayes’ theorem to the LOTTO scenario, we will use the following abbreviations: 
k = Holt’s background information. This includes (but is not exhausted by) the 
following salient points: that he bought two tickets for lotteries or raffles as 
described above, that his brother Klep stole one of these tickets, leaving the 
other in his possession; that Klep, while a kleptomaniac, is compulsively 
honest in truthfully confessing his misdeeds, and so on. 
E = Holt’s new evidence (Klep’s confession that the ticket he stole is the Dutch ticket).  
HL = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a losing ticket.  
HW = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket. 
In the next section, we shall also have occasion to use two further abbreviations: 
HWd = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket from the Dutch raffle. 
HWc = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket from the Catholic 
lottery. 
CORE says that Holt’s new evidence E counts as levering evidence for HL only if: were not-
HL true, then E would likely be different. This constraint, interpreted as a conditional probability, 
requires that P (E| ~HL & k) be low. Now ~HL is, in the scenario, the same as HW. So the 
constraint just requires that P (E| HW & k) be low. 
By working backwards from the fact that E is levering evidence for HL in the LOTTO 
scenario (a point on which we and McBrayer agree), we now aim to see what requirement Bayes’ 
theorem puts on this levering evidence, so as to compare it with the CORE requirement. 
3.2. THE BAYESIAN REQUIREMENT: STEP ONE 
We begin, then, by agreeing with McBrayer that in Holt’s situation, E most definitely is levering 
evidence for HL. In the improved scenario, Holt is reasonably shifted by his new evidence from 
square agnosticism to square belief. Holt begins in a state of squarely suspended belief, assigning 
to P(H | k) a probability of .5; his new evidence—being levering evidence—then properly boosts 
this to a probability of .99 or better.
53
 
 Plugging these into Bayes’ theorem, we get 
         [
 (E|HL    )
  (E| )
 ]  
Working backwards, it is evident by inspection that in this scenario, E’s being levering 
evidence for H requires The Quotient itself to be nearly 2. 
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3.3.  THE BAYESIAN REQUIREMENT: STEP TWO   
 But what, in turn, does this require? 
We can make one more step by noting that in the Lotto scenario, the numerator of The 
Quotient—namely, P (E| HL & k)—is close to 1. HL is, after all, the hypothesis that Holt holds a 
losing ticket, and our background information k includes the claim that the Dutch ticket is a sure 
winner. It follows that if Holt has a losing ticket, he must have a Catholic ticket. And Holt’s 
having a Catholic ticket entails that Klep must have stolen the Dutch ticket. But given (from our 
background information) Klep’s compulsive honesty, Klep stealing the Dutch ticket implies that 
his confession will be to stealing the Dutch ticket—which is just E. So, P (E| HL & k) is 1.
54
 But 
this means the Bayesian Formula now becomes  
         [
 
  (E| )
 ] 
Working backwards one more step, it is evident by inspection that in this scenario, E’s being 
levering evidence for H requires that The Quotient’s denominator—namely, P (E|k)—must be 
about .5.  
3.4.  THE BAYESIAN REQUIREMENT: VOILA! 
But what, in turn, does this require?  
To answer this, we must look closely at what the denominator P(E|k) signifies. Earlier we 
referred to the denominator as the “background expectability” of E on the assumption of our 
background information—k—alone. We contrast the denominator with the numerator, which is 
the “hypothetical expectability” of E on the assumption that the hypothesis of interest—here 
HL—is true. However, this contrast must not mislead us into thinking that P(E|k) is the 
probability of E on the hypothesis that HL is false. Rather, the value of P(E|k) is an average of 
E’s hypothetical expectability on both HL and HW, where those values are each corrected by a 
“weighting factor” of how likely, on their own, HL and HW are. That is, the value of P(E|k) in an 
expanded form is: 
 ( | )    (  |HL&k)   (HL| )   (E|HW &k)   (HW | ) 
In this expanded form, there are five terms, and four of them have values determined by the 
scenario. We saw in our last step that in order for E to be levering evidence, P (E |k) must be 
about .5. We also know from that step, that  (  HL& k) —the hypothetical expectability of E on 
HL—is 1. We know, from our first step, that  (HL| ) is .5. And we know that P(HW | k) is also 
.5, since HW is the denial of HL. Plugging these four values in gives us: 
                                   (E        )           
   Working backwards one more step, it is evident by visual inspection and a little arithmetic that 
for E to be levering evidence, the hypothetical expectability of E on HW (here put in boldface) 
must be very low—close to zero, comparatively speaking. That is: 
     (E|Hw & k)         
In other words, an application of Bayes’ theorem shows that E’s being levering evidence for 
HL requires that the conditional probability of E on HW (along with our background knowledge) 
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 Note that it is not a requirement of positive levering evidence (shifting one from square agnosticism to square 
belief) that the numerator of the Quotient have a value close to 1. What is required is the value of the Quotient be 





be very low—well below .5. But this more than satisfies what the CORE constraint requires! For 
the CORE constraint says that E is levering evidence for H only if, were H false, it is unlikely 
that one would get input E—in other words, that the conditional probability of E on not-H is 
below .5. 
This result should renew our confidence that CORE is fundamentally right-headed. For using 
only Bayes’ theorem, with no appeal at all to CORE, we have shown that in this McBrayer 
scenario, Bayes’ theorem entails the constraint on levering evidence that is imposed by CORE. 
Thus a Bayesian approach also dictates that unless this CORE constraint is satisfied, E cannot be 
levering evidence for HL. 
4.    BUT IS IT SATISFIED? BRIGHT LIGHT FROM AN OBSCURE CORNER 
But is the above constraint—that the conditional probability of E on HW be below .5—in point of 
fact satisfied in the scenario? So far we have shown only that if E is to be levering evidence in 
the scenario, then this constraint must be satisfied. But is it? Can we show this simply by 
focusing on the details of the scenario? We are now in a position to address this crucial question. 
4.1.  IS CORE SATISFIED? 
To evaluate whether the conditional probability P(E| Hw & k) is indeed low, it is crucial to notice 
that there are two ways in which Holt can possess the winning ticket—namely, by possessing a 
winning Catholic ticket, or by possessing the winning Dutch ticket. For this reason, determining  
P(E| Hw & k), the expectability of getting Klep’s testimony conditional on Holt’s holding a 
winning ticket, requires that we consider both the Catholic and Dutch ways of Holt’s holding a 
winning ticket. The expectability of getting E (Klep’s testimony) given Hw (that Holt holds a 
winning ticket) will be a weighted average. It will be weighted sum of E’s hypothetical 
expectabilities on each of the ways of Holt’s holding a winning ticket, with each multiplied by a 
corresponding “weighting factor” of how likely that way of holding a winning ticket is. That is: 
P (E|Hw & k) = [P (E| Hwd & k) * P (Hwd |k)]  +  [P (E| Hwc & k)  * P (Hwc |k)] 
                       = [     A d d e n d  # 1               ]  +  [     A d d e n d # 2                 ] 
Clearly, for P(E|Hw & k) to be very low, each addend must be very low. And in the actual 
scenario, as we shall now see, both addends are in fact very low—though for very different 
reasons. 
In the second addend, the first factor is P(E| Hwc & k). This is the conditional probability of 
evidence E—Klep’s testimony to having stolen the Dutch ticket—on the hypothesis of Holt’s 
having a winning Catholic ticket. This value is very high: 1, or nearly 1. But it is weighted by the 
second factor, P(Hwc |k). This is the background probability (on k alone) of Holt’s having a 
winning Catholic ticket. And this value is very low. The background probability that Holt has the 
winning Catholic ticket is, after all, equal to the probability on k of having a Catholic ticket 
(namely, .5) multiplied by the probability on k of that ticket winning (namely, .000001). This 
value is .0000005—that is, one in two million. And since the first factor of Addend #2 is equal to 
1, the value of Addend #2 is itself one over two million—which is very low indeed.  
Addend #1 is also very low, though for opposite reasons. Its weighting factor is P(Hwd |k). 
This is the probability of Holt’s having a winning Dutch ticket on k alone. The probability of 
having a Dutch ticket on k is .5, and since there is only one Dutch ticket, the probability of 
having a winning Dutch ticket on k is also .5. So the weighting factor here is .5. But what that 
factor weights is P(E| Hwd & k)— the conditional probability of E, on the hypothesis that Holt 




holds the winning Dutch ticket entails that Klep holds a Catholic ticket. And so on this 
hypothesis—given our background knowledge of Klep’s compulsive honesty—the conditional 
probability of Klep’s confessing to holding the Dutch ticket is extremely low. Addend #1, which 
multiplies this by the weighting factor of .5, is thus also extremely low.  
The sum of Addend 1 and Addend 2 is thus very low. And since that sum is equal to P(E| Hw 
& k), this means that the conditional probability of Klep’s testimony, on the hypothesis that Holt 
holds a winning ticket, is very low. And this more than satisfies what CORE requires. So the data 
of Klep’s testimony passes CORE’s acid test for levering evidence. This means that McBrayer’s 
LOTTO argument fails at its first premise:
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(Lotto-1) If CORE is right, then in the improved Lotto Story, Holt does not have 
levering evidence that his ticket is a losing ticket. 
Here Lotto-1 (as applied to CORE) rests on the claim that the data of Klep’s testimony does not 
satisfy the CORE constraint. On the conditional probability interpretation, this is false, and 
McBrayer’s Lotto Argument is unsuccessful.  
4.2.  AND IS CORNEA SATISFIED TOO? 
We’ve argued that on the conditional probability construal, crux is true: the data of Klep’s 
testimony thus meets the CORE constraint, and CORE does not fall to the improved LOTTO 
counterexample. But what about CORNEA? For the internalist CORNEA to stand, what matters 
is not whether crux is true, but whether crux is something reasonable for Holt to believe. 
Let’s imagine Holt anxiously wondering whether he should regard Klep’s new testimony as 
levering evidence, and thus be levered into regretfully but squarely believing that his ticket is a 
loser. Suppose Holt engages in the following soliloquy: 
Hmm. Klep confessed to stealing the Dutch ticket? Well, what should I expect, 
regarding Klep’s testimony, if I were to have a winning ticket? Should I in that event 
expect Klep’s testimony to be different than it is—i.e., should expect that he would 
have confessed to stealing the Catholic ticket? Or should I, in that event, expect 
Klep’s testimony to be the same—to confess that the ticket he stole is the Dutch 
ticket? 
This is a bit tricky to figure out retrospectively, because as it happens, I already 
know what my brother did testify. So let’s imagine I don’t know this—that his 
confession is in a sealed envelope, that I rightly expect it to be as compulsively 
honest as usual, but that I haven’t opened the envelope yet. And now suppose that 
my wife has just called me and told me that I’ve won one of the lotteries, but the 
reception is bad and I didn’t hear which one. So having gotten the information that I 
have a winning ticket, how expectable is it, given that information, that Klep’s letter 
in the sealed envelope says that the ticket he stole is the Dutch ticket? 
Intuitively, it is compelling clear that it isn’t likely at all: on the supposition that 
I’ve got a winning ticket, the odds are vastly in favor of his having stolen—and so of 
confessing in his letter to have stolen—the Catholic ticket (leaving me with the 
Dutch ticket).   
But why is this? Well, there’s no doubt some complex way to calculate this using 
probability theory, using the total probability theorem, weighted averages, and the 
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like. But I will leave that to others; I haven’t studied that stuff since college. I’d just 
put it this way. Prior to opening Klep’s letter, on my background information, it is 
50/50 whether I hold the Dutch ticket or the Catholic ticket. But on new information 
that I have a winning ticket, this changes: my holding the Dutch ticket becomes 
vastly more probable than my holding the Catholic ticket; and—consequently—it 
becomes vastly more probable that the ticket stolen by Klep, and confessed to in his 
letter, is the Catholic ticket, not the Dutch ticket. As things actually stand,  of course, 
he has confessed to having stolen the Dutch ticket; but if I were to have a winning 
ticket, it would be extremely likely that things would stand differently—that his 
confession would be to having stolen the Catholic ticket.   
This line of thinking is reasonable, and it is one that Holt—a competent rational adult—could 
utilize. It thus makes it reasonable for Holt to believe that if he had a winning ticket, his evidence 
would likely be different. The CORNEA constraint is thus met. And Lotto-1 (as applied to 
CORNEA) is false: 
(Lotto-1) If CORNEA is right, then in the improved Lotto Story, Holt is not entitled to 
claim that his ticket is a losing ticket on the basis of Klep’s testimony. 
So, McBrayer’s LOTTO scenario fails as a counterexample to CORNEA. 
5.  TWO EVALUATIONAL CONTEXTS 
We’ve argued that McBrayer’s counterexample does not tell against the probabilistic 
renderings of CORNEA and CORE. Why then does it seem so plausible against the 
counterfactual renderings of CORNEA and CORE? 
 We think that the counterfactual treatment creates a strong pressure to conflate two 
distinct contexts, which we’ll call the pre- and post-evaluational contexts. Put simply, the pre-
evaluational context is where data is yet to be evaluated; the post-evaluational context is where it 
has been evaluated.  In the LOTTO scenario, Holt begins in a pre-evaluational context, where it 
is equally probable that he holds the Dutch or Catholic ticket. He then receives, as new data, the 
alleged evidence of Klep’s testimony. Because Holt immediately discerns its evidential bearing, 
he immediately moves to the post-evaluational context, in which he has been (properly) levered 
to square belief that he holds a Catholic (and hence almost certainly losing) ticket. Now CORE is 
a norm addressing the question of whether some data alleged to be levering evidence actually is. 
In applying CORE (and CORNEA), it is thus crucial to answer the test question regarding the 
truth or reasonableness of crux within the pre-evaluational context: to answer it in the post-
evaluational context would be to beg the very question at issue. 
McBrayer’s counterfactual construal makes this question-begging mistake a very natural one. 
In the LOTTO scenario, the test question takes the form “If it were false that Holt has a losing 
ticket (i.e., were he to have a winning ticket), would his new data likely be different?” To 
evaluate this as a counterfactual, one must determine the closest antecedent world(s)—i.e., the 
world(s) in which Holt has a winning ticket that are most similar (on a relevant similarity-
ordering) to the real word. McBrayer takes the closest antecedent world to be one where Holt 
happens to have a winning Catholic ticket. He does so, presumably, because it is what Klep’s 
testimony so strongly and obviously indicates. This shift to the post-evaluational context, while 
begging the question, is abetted by the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics.  On that semantics, 
which antecedent world is “closest” is determined by how the real world actually is. When we 
are unsure or undecided about some relevant feature of the real world (like whether Holt has the 




what the real world is like by making use of the new alleged evidence. The probabilistic 
treatment creates no such pressure.
 
For when we ask the crucial question when the antecedent is 
epistemically “forked” (i.e., when we are undecided as between the Dutch way or the Catholic 
way of his holding a winning ticket), this treatment allows us to use weighted averages to take 
into account both prongs of the fork.  
Where does this leave us on whether inductive evidence must be, in a Nozickean 
counterfactual sense, “sensitive” to the way the world is? Our results leave this as a vexing 
question. To the extent that Nozick’s sensitivity requirement is tied to logical subjunctives, the 
answer will depend on whether the semantics for such subjunctives can be modified so as to 
incorporate the key strength of the conditional probability interpretation—namely, its use of 
Bayesian analysis and weighted averages—so as to handle “epistemic forks” between divergent 
ways in which the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional can be true or false. Our results here 
open the possibility that sensitivity accounts could be rejuvenated by the injection of this 
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